UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1998/652
16 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 16 January to 15 July 1998)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 1151 (1998) of 30 January 1998, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six months, until 31 July 1998. It covers developments since the previous report, dated 20 January 1998 (S/1998/53).

II. SITUATION IN THE AREA OF OPERATION

2. During the past six months, the number of operations conducted by armed elements against the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and its local Lebanese auxiliary, the de facto forces (DFF), increased significantly. UNIFIL recorded 348 such operations (12 in the second half of January, 49 in February, 65 in March, 66 in April, 88 in May, 49 in June and 19 in the first half of July). This represents a 40 per cent increase over the previous reporting period and is the highest number in many years. There were also reports of about 300 operations north of the Litani River. The vast majority of those operations were carried out by the Islamic Resistance, the military wing of the Shiite Muslim Hizbullah organization. The Shiite movement Amal increased its activities, taking responsibility for about 60 operations. A number of operations were carried out by other Lebanese groups, while Palestinian groups conducted two operations. The armed elements employed small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles, recoilless rifles, rockets and explosive devices. They fired more than 3,500 mortar rounds, rockets and anti-tank missiles, as compared to about 2,500 rounds in the previous reporting period.

3. IDF/DFF, in response to attacks or in operations they initiated, employed artillery, mortars, tanks, helicopter gunships, fixed-wing aircraft and explosive devices. IDF continued its practice of conducting pre-emptive artillery bombardments and long-range patrols beyond its forward positions.

UNIFIL recorded close to 10,300 rounds of artillery, mortar, tanks and missiles fired by IDF/DFF, which was about the same level as in the last reporting period. IDF conducted air raids near Brashit on 2 July and near Yatar on 7 July. Another 58 air raids were carried out against targets north of the Litani River, including one on 12 May in which several members of a Palestinian group were killed. As before, the Israeli navy patrolled the Lebanese territorial waters in the south and continued to impose restrictions on local fishermen.

4. There was a decrease in civilian casualties during the reporting period. Twelve civilians were killed, as compared to thirty-four in the previous reporting period:

(a) In UNIFIL's area of operation, a civilian was killed near Majdal Zun by an explosive device planted by IDF/DFF on 5 February. On 14 February, five civilians were injured in Shihin by a shell or a rocket fired by unidentified persons. Two civilians were wounded in Brashit by IDF/DFF fire on 26 March. A serious incident occurred on 31 March when a truck transporting civilian labourers who had been working for IDF/DFF was hit near Kaoukaba by a roadside bomb placed by armed elements. Six of them were killed and another was wounded. On 6 April, a civilian was killed and three others wounded near Markabe by a roadside bomb planted by armed elements. On 25 and 27 April, two civilians were injured in Kafra and Zibqin, respectively, by IDF/DFF fire. On 8 May, six civilians were injured in Al Mansouri by IDF/DFF fire, three of them seriously. On 26 May, two civilians were injured, one in Yatar and one in Haddathah by IDF/DFF fire;

(b) A number of serious incidents were also reported from outside the area of operation. A civilian was killed by a roadside bomb near Jezzine on 27 January. On 2 April, a civilian was killed by IDF/DFF fire on the road between Aarab Salim and El Louaize. On 31 May, a civilian was killed and another was wounded near Aarab Salim by a rocket fired by IDF. On 19 June, a five-year-old boy was killed in Jezzine by a roadside bomb planted by armed elements while riding in a car with his father, a member of the DFF. There were other reports of civilian injuries caused by both armed elements and IDF/DFF.

5. Within the Israeli-controlled area (ICA), Israel continued to maintain a civil administration and security service. The infrastructure in the ICA (road system, electricity, water supply, public buildings) continued to be improved, primarily owing to aid provided by the Government of Lebanon. However, ICA remained economically dependent on Israel, where more than 2,500 of the inhabitants go to work every day.

6. IDF/DFF carried out search operations in several villages in ICA and, from time to time, restricted the movements of the inhabitants. A number of civilians were arrested and imprisoned in Khiam, while others were expelled from their villages and ordered to leave ICA. The inhabitants of Chebaa were particularly affected. On 25 and 26 June, the remains of an Israeli serviceman and those of armed elements were exchanged with the help of the International Committee of the Red Cross. In the context of this exchange, some 60 people imprisoned in Khiam were released. On 18 January, a local civilian employee of UNIFIL was arrested and sent to Khiam, but was released on the following day.

7. UNIFIL continued its efforts to limit the conflict and to protect the inhabitants from the fighting. Through its network of checkpoints and observation posts and an active programme of patrolling, as well as continuous contacts with the parties, the Force did its best to prevent the area of operation from being used for hostile activities and to defuse situations that could lead to escalation. The Force was also deployed, as necessary, to provide a measure of protection to villages and to farmers working in the fields.

8. In carrying out its functions, the Force at times encountered hostile reactions by both armed elements and IDF/DFF. On 17 January, two armed elements threatened United Nations personnel at a checkpoint. On 23 January, armed elements, whose cars had been stopped at a UNIFIL checkpoint, fired a number of small arms rounds, some of which impacted near the checkpoint. UNIFIL returned warning shots. On 22 March, armed elements fired a few rounds of small arms at United Nations armoured personnel carriers. On 24 April, armed elements threatened United Nations personnel at gunpoint. On 23 April, an IDF/DFF armoured personnel carrier caused damage to a United Nations checkpoint by attempting a forced entry. On 22 May, IDF/DFF members threatened to open fire at United Nations personnel who were monitoring their activities. UNIFIL strongly protested the above incidents.

9. In July 1996, UNIFIL obtained a commitment from IDF to respect a safety zone around UNIFIL positions and received assurances from the Islamic Resistance that they would not operate in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. During the reporting period, both sides, by and large, showed restraint in this regard. However, on a number of occasions, armed elements did operate in the vicinity of United Nations positions. For example, on 2 and 3 July, in connection with a coordinated attack against several IDF/DFF positions, there were seven incidents of firing from locations near United Nations positions. UNIFIL protested these incidents through the Lebanese army. UNIFIL recorded a total of 72 firings at or close to its positions and personnel (25 by armed elements, 42 by IDF/DFF and 5 by unidentified elements). On 5 June, a mortar round fired by IDF/DFF impacted at a United Nations position and caused damage. On 13 July, two mortar rounds fired by IDF/DFF impacted near a United Nations position, injuring an Irish soldier as well as a Lebanese civilian who was passing nearby. UNIFIL promptly protested these and other incidents to the authorities concerned.

10. UNIFIL continued to extend assistance to the civilian population in its area of operation in the form of medical care, casualty evacuation, harvest patrols, the distribution of educational material and equipment to poorer schools and environment sanitation. In addition, water projects, equipment or services for schools and orphanages and supplies to social services and needy people were provided from resources made available by troop-contributing countries. UNIFIL medical centres and mobile teams provided care to an average of 4,000 civilian patients per month and a field dental programme treated approximately 200 cases per month. UNIFIL also assisted the Government of Lebanon in transporting and distributing supplies to villages in ICA when those villages faced shortages owing to restrictions imposed by IDF/DFF. Throughout the period, UNIFIL cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations and agencies operating in Lebanon. As in the

past, UNIFIL continued the disposal of unexploded ordnance in its area of operation. In all, 69 controlled explosions were carried out.

11. The monitoring group set up in accordance with the understanding of 26 April 1996 held 16 meetings at UNIFIL headquarters to consider complaints by Israel and Lebanon. UNIFIL provided facilities for the meetings, as well as transport for the members of the group.

III. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

12. From 17 to 26 March 1998, I visited the Middle East, including Israel, Lebanon and Syria. The implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) was discussed in my meetings with the leaders of the three countries and I used the opportunity to explore their views on the subject. I have since had further meetings in New York with the Prime Ministers of Israel and Lebanon and with officials of other interested countries.

13. On 1 April 1998, the Ministerial Committee for National Security of the Government of Israel adopted a decision on Israel's acceptance of resolution 425 (1978) (see S/1998/301). The decision stated, among other things, that Israel was accepting resolution 425 (1978) so that IDF would leave Lebanon with appropriate security arrangements and called on Lebanon to begin negotiations.

14. The Government of Lebanon, in the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 22 April to the President of the Security Council (S/1998/341), noted, among other things, that the Council had attached no security or political conditions to the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and that the latter did not provide for negotiations. It stated that any negotiations between Lebanon and Israel could only be on subjects relating to resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and certain other subjects in the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Government of Syria has indicated that it shares these views.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

15. As at 30 June 1998, UNIFIL comprised 4,480 troops from Fiji (586), Finland (486), France (246), Ghana (644), Ireland (609), Italy (52), Nepal (601), Norway (625) and Poland (631). UNIFIL was assisted in its tasks by 55 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). In addition, UNIFIL employed 463 civilian staff, of whom 130 were recruited internationally and 333 locally. Major-General Jioji Konousi Konrote continued as Force Commander. The deployment of UNIFIL is shown on the attached map.

16. On 18 June, the Government of Norway conveyed to me the decision to withdraw its infantry battalion from UNIFIL at the end of November 1998. I am in touch with potential contributors in order to obtain a replacement.

17. I regret to report the death of four members of the Force. A Polish soldier and a Ghanaian soldier died of natural causes on 17 January and 4 June respectively. On 4 June, two Nepalese soldiers were killed in a traffic

accident. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 222 members of the Force have lost their lives: 76 as a result of firings or bomb explosions, 92 in accidents and 54 from other causes. A total of 332 have been wounded by firing, or by mine or bomb explosions.

18. UNIFIL maintained close contact with the Lebanese authorities on matters of mutual concern. Those authorities provided valuable assistance in connection with the rotation of troops and logistic activities in Beirut. The Lebanese army was helpful in defusing confrontations with armed elements. It also provided accommodation for some UNIFIL contingents while on leave in Lebanon. The Force continued to cooperate with the Lebanese Internal Security Forces on matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order, including on an occasion of local elections.

19. The problem of the rents owed by the Government of Lebanon to the owners of the land and premises used by UNIFIL has still not been resolved. Not all owners have received payment and there is continuing controversy over the lists of owners prepared by the Lebanese authorities.

V. FINANCIAL MATTERS

20. By its resolution 52/237 of 26 June 1998, the General Assembly appropriated to the Special Account for UNIFIL an amount of $142,984,560 gross for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999, based on an average strength of 4,513 troops and a continuation of its existing responsibilities. The assessment of the appropriation, which is equivalent to $11,915,380 gross per month, is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Force beyond 31 July 1998.

21. As at 30 June 1998, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNIFIL amounted to $103.5 million. The total unpaid assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1.5 billion.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

22. During the past six months, fighting in south Lebanon continued and civilians were again put at risk, although the number of those who were killed decreased. UNIFIL continued its efforts to limit the conflict and to protect the inhabitants from the fighting. The situation in the area, however, remained volatile and continued to give cause for serious concern. I am also concerned at instances of harassment of United Nations personnel.

23. I have reported in paragraphs 12 to 14 above on my contacts concerning the implementation of resolution 425 (1978). I shall continue to follow developments closely and stay in touch with all concerned.

24. The Permanent Representative of Lebanon, in a letter addressed to me on 26 June 1998 (S/1998/584), conveyed his Government's request that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months.

25. During my trip to the Middle East, I visited UNIFIL headquarters where I met with the Force Commander and his senior military and civilian staff. This visit reinforced my view that, although UNIFIL has been prevented from implementing the mandate contained in resolution 425 (1978), UNIFIL's contribution to stability and the protection it provides to the population of the area remain important. I therefore recommend that the Security Council respond positively to the request of the Government of Lebanon and extend the mandate of UNIFIL for another period of six months, until 31 January 1999.

26. I must again draw attention to the serious shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to $103.5 million. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears. I should also like to express my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to the Force, in particular those of developing countries, for their understanding and patience in these difficult circumstances.

27. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Major-General Jioji Konousi Konrote and to the men and women under his command for the manner in which they have carried out their difficult and often dangerous task. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.


وزع بعثة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
في تموز/يوليه ١٩٩٨
1998年7月联黎部队的部署情形
UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JULY 1998
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL EN JULLIET 1998
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ИЮЛЬ 1998
DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN JULIO DE 1998
160°E
170
180
190
310°N
300
290
280°N
35° 20'
35° 10'
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
TRANSIT BASE
NAQOURA
LAB (OGL)
HIN (OGL)
RAS (OGL)
FINBATT
GHANBATT
FIJIBATT
NEPBATT
IRISHBATT
HQ FINLAND
HQ GHANA
HQ FIJI
HQ NEPAL
HQ IRELAND
POLAND
FMR+
XX
HQ UNIFIL
LOG POLAND
COMP FRANCE
ITALY
MP COMPOSITE
POLAND
OGL
Map No. 3000 Rev. 44 UNITED NATIONS
July 1998



مركز مراقبة
观察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación

نقطة تفتيش
检查站
Check point
Point de contrôle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de control

قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base

موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional

الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب
قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Limites entre batallones de la Fuerza

حدود مناطق عمليات
قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区西部和北边界线
UNIFIL Operational boundaries: West and North
Limite de la zone d'operations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte

وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unité libanaise
Ливанские подразделения
Unidad libanesa

موقع لقوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو «جيش جنوب لبنان»
以色列国防军和/或"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position
Position des Forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"

الامتداد الشمالي المنطقة التي تسيطر عليها إسرائيل
以色列控制地区向北延伸部分
Northward extension of Israeli controlled area
Extension vers le nord de la zone contrôlée par Israël
Северная часть территории, контролируемой Израилем
Extensión septentrional de la zona controlada por Israel

المساحة التقريبية لما يقع تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية من منطقة عمل قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区内在以色列控制下地区概况
Approximate area under Israeli control in UNIFIL area of operation
Périmètre approximatif de la zone sous contrôle israélien dans la zone d'opérations de la FINUL
Примерный район в зоне действия ВСООНЛ, находящийся под контролем Израиля
Area aproximada bajo control israelí dentro de la zone de operaciones de la Fuerza

0 1 2 3 4 5 km
0 1 2 3 mi

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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 30 June 1998 by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stating that Sir Jeremy Quentin Greenstock has been appointed representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

98-20854 (E) 160798

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LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1998 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the remarks of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connection with the report of the Secretary-General dated 2 June 1998, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1160 (1998).

I would appreciate it if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

98-20860 (E) 170798

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Annex

Remarks of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connection with the report of the Secretary-General dated 2 June 1998, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1160 (1998)

The report of the Secretary-General dated 2 June 1998, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998 emphasizes the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and the ever greater number of refugees and displaced persons. However, no mention is made of the true causes of these developments.

The increase in violence in Kosovo and Metohija is brought about through the escalation of terrorist activity by the extremist separatist elements of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija despite the efforts of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia to solve the problems in this Province peacefully. This fact, as well as the fact that the terrorists are aided and financed from abroad and that men and arms are dispatched to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in an organized way, have been noted by the representatives of the international community on many occasions.

Civilian population and property and government institutions and authorities have been targets of terrorists. In the period between 1 January and 8 July 1998 alone, Albanian separatists carried out 659 terrorist actions in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Three hundred ninety-eight of these actions have been carried out against civilians and their property; 62 persons have been killed and 36 gravely and 37 lightly wounded. One hundred civilians have been abducted; 14 persons have been killed, 52 are unaccounted for and 24 persons have been released. Two hundred sixty-one terrorist attacks have been carried out against the members and property of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia; 31 members of the Ministry have been killed, 64 gravely and 39 lightly wounded and 5 members have been abducted. In 303 attacks, the Albanian separatists used automatic weapons, anti-armour launchers or mortars; in 44 instances they used snipers; in 17, hand grenades; in 5, explosive devices; and in 2 instances, handguns. They have burned houses and expelled the residents, sometimes even entire villages. In 204 other instances, the terrorists carried out their actions with a threat to use firearms. In addition to the said criminal acts of terrorism, 20 cases of vehicles being stopped and passengers being searched have been reported, as well as 29 terrorist raids of houses and other premises, all of which constitute grave criminal offenses.

The report condemns continued violence and calls on the two sides to show restraint and resume negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution. However, it makes no mention of the party responsible for the interruption of the dialogue. In failing to do so, the report does not elucidate the situation and makes no contribution to the resumption of negotiations.

The Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia are firmly committed to the continuation of dialogue on all questions

without any preconditions and without delay. These questions concern confidence-building measures and forms of self-governance and autonomy, which are to be based on full respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the equality of all their citizens and ethnic communities and on international human rights standards.

The Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia have invested their best efforts in promoting dialogue and reaching peaceful, democratic and humane solutions, acting all along in accordance with law, responsibly and with utmost restraint.

Conversely, the leaders of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija have used every opportunity to stall the negotiations and eventually to interrupt the dialogue initiated after the meeting between President Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova on 15 May 1998. They have done so also in an attempt to buy time for terrorists to extort new international pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This policy, however, has recently been internationally condemned and major international factors have called on Kosovo and Metohija Albanian extremists to desist from separatism and terrorism. These factors have also undertaken to refrain from every action or gesture that would encourage opponents of dialogue and proponents of terrorism. An unequivocal condemnation of separatism and terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija would greatly contribute to the continuation of dialogue.

The Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia are fully committed to solving all outstanding issues related to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija through political and peaceful means and unconditional dialogue. The framework for the solution of all these issues is full respect for the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, equality of all the citizens and ethnic communities in the Province, full respect for relevant United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe standards in the fields of human rights and national minorities.

The Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia guarantee equality to all their citizens, irrespective of their national, religious or ethnic origins. However, they provide sanctions for all those who are in breach of the laws of the country and threaten its integrity and sovereignty.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia are ready to continue the dialogue on the entire complex of problems besetting Kosovo and Metohija. To this end, they have supported the Moscow joint statement of Presidents Milosevic and Yeltsin (see A/1998/526, annex) and taken concrete measures to implement its provisions. The ongoing implementation of these measures is telling proof of Yugoslavia's firm commitment to the policy of dialogue and a quest for a peaceful solution.

Of particular concern are humanitarian questions, including measures relating to the return of persons displaced by terrorist activities. To promote these measures, the Government of the Republic of Serbia has adopted a concrete

programme of return for these persons, providing material assistance for the reconstruction of their homes.

In that context, contacts have been made with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Offices of the United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights, aimed at establishing meaningful cooperation and bringing about joint involvement in solving all questions relating to the return of displaced persons. Letters have been sent to Mr. Sommaruga, Mrs. Ogata and Mrs. Robinson, and extensive contacts and mutually satisfactory cooperation have been established with their representatives in Belgrade and field officers in Pristina.

A request has been made to Mrs. Ogata to assist the visit of the Commissioner for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia to Albania to tackle the problem of return of displaced persons. In a letter dated 30 June 1998, the representative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Belgrade expressed UNHCR readiness to help in this regard and conveyed the satisfaction of High Commissioner Ogata with the constructive cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has taken all necessary measures to ensure successful solutions of this problem, guaranteeing safe return and security to all the returnees.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has also lifted all restrictions on the access and free movement of foreign diplomats, representatives of international organizations and journalists in Kosovo and Metohija. It has also expressed readiness to allow the countries that have requested it to increase the number of personnel in their embassies in Belgrade.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has recently opened talks with the representatives of OSCE on simultaneous normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with the Organization and the return of the long-term mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is expected that the talks will be resumed soon.

No threat to neighbouring countries, much less to regional peace and security, ensues from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is resolved to solve all problems by political means and, in so doing, is guided by the principles of openness, good-neighbourliness, equitable cooperation, non-interference into internal affairs and full respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries.

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LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia concerning the tragic death of Maria Magdalena Wewiorska, a member of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter CHKHEIDZE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-20920 (E) 160798 160798

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Annex

[Original: English]

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its deep concern at the murder of the Polish citizen, Maria Magdalena Wewiorska, staff member of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, and extends profound condolences to the family of the deceased.

Georgian authorities, in particular law enforcement agencies, will take all necessary measures to bring those who committed this shocking crime to justice.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its hope that this tragic event will not impede the activities of the United Nations and other international organizations aimed at resolving conflicts and facilitating democratic build-up.

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to draw your attention to another act of infiltration into the territory of the Republic of Korea by at least one armed agent of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, whose body was found on 12 July 1998. As you may recall, I requested your attention to a similar act of infiltration by a North Korean submarine caught on 22 June 1998 in the territorial waters of the Republic of Korea in my letter of 2 July 1998 (S/1998/607).

On 12 July 1998, around 0920 hours local time, a body clad in a diving suit was found on a beach near Tonghae, an east coast city of the Republic of Korea, 90 km south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Along with the body were found a Czech-made submachine gun, hand grenades, a transmission device and other equipment typically used for infiltration by North Korean agents. A semi-submersible torpedo-like propellant designed to carry infiltrating agents was also found nearby.

A special investigative team of the Government of the Republic of Korea has concluded from the evidence gathered at the site that the dead body was that of a North Korean agent belonging to the operational detachment of the North Korean Workers' Party, which was also responsible for the recent act of submarine infiltration.

This incident constitutes yet another serious act of provocation by North Korea, in clear violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement and the 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North. It is deeply regrettable that such an act of provocation has recurred, even as the United Nations Command-Korean People's Army officers' meeting is still dealing with the previous incident of submarine infiltration. My Government has already returned to North Korea the bodies of the nine crew members found dead in that submarine, out of humanitarian considerations.

Such repeated acts of provocation perpetrated by North Korea contradict its assurances that such an incident would not recur in the future, as provided in the statement on 29 December 1996, following the earlier incident of submarine infiltration in September 1996. We are deeply concerned that these acts of

provocation, if continued, could undermine the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula.

The Government of the Republic of Korea strongly urges the North Korean authorities, once again, to renounce all acts of military provocation against the Republic of Korea. We demand that the North acknowledge its responsibility and take appropriate measures, including making a public apology, punishing those responsible for these acts of provocation and promising that such acts will not recur in the future.

For your reference, I wish to enclose a copy of the statements issued by the Ministry of National Defence, on 12 July 1998, and the National Security Council of the Republic of Korea, on 15 July 1998 (see annexes I and II).

I would be grateful if you would have this letter and the attached documents circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) LEE See-young
Permanent Representative

Annex I

Statement of 12 July 1998 of the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea on North Korea's armed provocation

After thoroughly analysing the body of the armed commando found wearing a diving suit in Tonghae, Kangwon Province, at approximately 0920 hours on 12 July 1998, the joint investigation team concluded that the commando was clearly on an armed infiltration mission from North Korea.

Such provocation by North Korea is yet another clear violation of the Armistice Agreement and a serious military provocation, following the infiltration incident involving a submarine and commandos in Kangneung, on 18 September 1996, and another incursion by a North Korean submarine on 22 June 1998.

In the statement issued at the time of the recent submarine incursion, the Ministry of National Defence demanded that North Korea acknowledge its provocation, punish those responsible and assure that similar incidents will not recur in the future. The Ministry, as well as the entire Korean people, cannot hide their profound indignation and shock that North Korea made such an outrageous military provocation at this point, when discussion on the similar incident is still under way between the two sides in the General Officers' meeting at Panmunjom.

We once again urge North Korea to stop all of its reckless armed provocations in breach of the Armistice Agreement and we sternly warn that we will not tolerate any further provocative actions.

Annex II

National Security Council of the Republic of Korea
resolution 1998-1 of 15 July 1998

North Korea continues to pose a grave security threat to the Republic of Korea by committing various acts of provocation, while steadfastly maintaining its policy to communize the South despite the Government of the Republic of Korea's policy of engagement towards the Pyongyang regime to facilitate reconciliation and cooperation and to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Against this background, the National Security Council confirmed that the infiltration incidents of the North Korean midget submarine in the East Coast and its armed agent in Mook-ho as serious acts of provocation, which constitute a breach of both the Armistice Agreement and the South-North Basic Agreement.

The Council, after assessing the North's policy towards the South, re-evaluating the unified readiness posture of the civil-government-military defence system and after considering various response measures towards the North, including diplomatic actions, has decided as follows:

1. North Korea should immediately cease all acts of provocation that threaten the peace on the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, it must take measures acceptable to our people by acknowledging that the recent infiltration incidents are in violation of the Armistice Agreement and the South-North Basic Agreement, making an apology, punishing those responsible for those incidents and taking measures to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

In order to realize our just claims, the Government of the Republic of Korea will strongly urge the North to take sincere efforts in this regard through various channels including General Officers' talks in Panmunjom, international organizations and cooperation with friendly nations.

2. Amidst continuing provocation from the North, in order to strengthen our military readiness and enlist the support of the general public, the Government of the Republic of Korea will:

(a) Reinforce its maritime and coastal alertness posture and formulate and execute an integrated preparedness plan;

(b) Strengthen military cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America to deter armed provocation and improve our counter-infiltration capability;

(c) Facilitate the operation of the central and local Integrated Defense Committees and establish the Civilian Reporting System to reorganize and reinforce a regional civil-government-military defence posture in rear areas.

3. The Government of the Republic of Korea will continue to pursue the three principles of its North Korea policy, with a view to improving inter-Korean

relations and materializing peace, reconciliation and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula:

(a) We will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind;

(b) We do not have any intention to undermine or absorb North Korea;

(c) We will actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North, as stipulated in the South-North Basic Agreement.

Considering the complexity of the current situation, the Government of the Republic of Korea will continue to maintain a robust security posture and to promote exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North. We also reaffirm that only a strong security posture will prepare the ground for reconciliation and cooperation, while improvement in inter-Korean relations through reconciliation and cooperation will reduce threats on the Korean Peninsula.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1998/657
16 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 JULY 1998 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to draw to your attention the statement issued on 7 July 1998 by the Contact Group regarding the situation in Kosovo (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gerard HENZE
Ambassador
Acting Permanent Representative
of Germany
to the United Nations

98-20914 (E) 170798

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Annex

Statement on Kosovo issued by the Contact Group on 8 July 1998

1. The Contact Group met in Bonn on 8 July. It reviewed the situation in Kosovo and took stock of the parties' response to the requirements set out in the statement on Kosovo issued in London on 12 June by Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group and of Canada and Japan (S/1998/567, annex), and implementation of the undertakings made by President Milosevic in Moscow on 16 June (see S/1998/526, annex).

2. The overall situation in Kosovo remains tense. The Contact Group noted with deep concern that, despite vigorous efforts undertaken by the members of the Contact Group, the prospects of a peaceful settlement have deteriorated since the Contact Group's meeting in London on 12 June 1998. Although the primary responsibility for the situation in Kosovo rests with Belgrade, the Contact Group acknowledges that armed Kosovo Albanian groups also have a responsibility to avoid violence and all armed activities. The Contact Group reiterated that violence is inadmissible and will not solve the problem of Kosovo. Indeed it will only make it more difficult to achieve a political solution. The Contact Group stressed its condemnation of violence and acts of terrorism in pursuit of political goals, from whatever quarter.

3. The Contact Group assessed Belgrade's response to the requirements set out in the 12 June London statement: to cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression; to enable an effective and continuous international observer group in Kosovo and allow unimpeded access for observers; to facilitate, in agreement with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the full return to their homes of refugees and displaced persons and to allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo; and to make rapid progress in the dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian leadership. The Contact Group noted that:

- Withdrawal of security forces used for civilian repression has not yet been carried out, although the security forces have shown some measure of restraint recently;

- Rapid progress in the dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian leadership has not been achieved.

4. The Contact Group acknowledged the significance of the undertakings given by President Milosevic in his meeting with President Yeltsin on 16 June and emphasized the need for them to be fully implemented.

- It noted President Milosevic's commitment to allow international observers free and unrestricted access to Kosovo, which is in a first stage of implementation. It expected Belgrade to cooperate fully with those States which were enhancing their capability to observe

developments in Kosovo through secondment of additional personnel to their diplomatic representations in Belgrade. The Contact Group expected that President Milosevic's stated commitment to allow international observers in Kosovo will also permit an increase of size of the European Community Monitoring Mission presence in Kosovo.

- The Contact Group noted that there has been some improvement in the access to Kosovo for international humanitarian organizations such as UNHCR and ICRC. But the Contact Group also urged Belgrade to do more to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, in particular by agreeing to security confidence-building measures. The Contact Group expressed its support for UNHCR'S regional approach to the refugee question. The Contact Group encouraged the European Union and other competent international organizations to continue to pursue the commitment of resources in order to create the conditions for an early return of refugees throughout the region.

5. The Contact Group called for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Kosovo in order to pave the way for continuous talks between Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian leadership on additional confidence-building measures and the future status of Kosovo. Contact Group members will pursue this goal through immediate talks with both Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians. It is clear that the Kosovo Albanian team for all these talks must be fully representative of their community in order to speak authoritatively.

6. The Contact Group concluded that Belgrade needed to take further action to implement fully the undertakings made by President Milosevic in Moscow on 16 June and the requirements of the Contact Group. The Contact Group also concluded that all concerned on the Kosovo Albanian side should commit themselves to dialogue and a peaceful settlement and reject violence and acts of terrorism. The Contact Group insisted that those outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who are supplying financial support, arms or training for armed Kosovo Albanian groups should cease doing so immediately. It furthermore requested all States to pursue, as a matter of urgency, all means consistent with their domestic laws and relevant International Law, to prevent funds collected on their territory being used to contravene Security Council resolution 1160 (1998). Against this background, the Contact Group decided to pursue Security Council consideration of the adoption of a resolution reiterating the requirements mentioned above. This resolution should underline the need for a cessation of hostilities to permit a meaningful dialogue between the parties; enshrine the undertakings made by President Milosevic in Moscow; and require the authorities in Belgrade and all those concerned on the Kosovo Albanian side to ensure the safety of international observers operating in Kosovo. Should the required steps not be taken, the Contact Group will consider further action under the Charter of the United Nations, including action that may require the authorization of a Security Council resolution, to bring about compliance by those who block the process.

7. The Contact Group reiterated that it supports neither the maintenance of the status quo in Kosovo nor the Kosovo Albanians' claims for independence. It emphasized that international involvement in the dialogue between the Belgrade

authorities and representatives of the Kosovo Albanian community was an essential element of credible negotiations.

8. With this in mind, the Contact Group agreed to recommend to the negotiating teams basic elements for a resolution of the question of Kosovo's status. Contact Group members reaffirmed their intention to work actively for the achievement of the resolution of this issue.

9. As part of this, in order to help the parties, the Contact Group set in hand work to define possible further elements for the future status of Kosovo, which would be made available to the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian community for a dialogue with international involvement.

10. Should substantive talks begin with the necessary security confidence-building measures in place and the launch of the mission of the Special Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Contact Group remains prepared to promote a clear and achievable path towards Belgrade's full integration in the international community including participation in OSCE. The Contact Group's goal continues to be that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should reap the benefits of membership of international financial and political institutions.

11. The Contact Group expressed its concern about the situation in neighbouring countries. It asked competent international organizations to examine options further to stabilize the situation in Albania. The Contact Group also supported the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force beyond 31 August 1998.

12. The Contact Group noted that the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had now expressed the view that the situation in Kosovo represented an armed conflict within the terms of the mandate of the Tribunal. It reiterated its call for Belgrade and all those in Kosovo to cooperate with the Prosecutor's investigation of possible violations of international humanitarian law; and requested international observers operating in Kosovo to supply the Prosecutor with any relevant information.

13. The Contact Group noted that a representative of the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE met government representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 3 July in Belgrade. The Contact Group supported the continuation of contacts between OSCE and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with a view to the unimpeded and early return of the long-term OSCE missions to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the early launching of the mission of the Special Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and a dialogue across the full range of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's relations with OSCE.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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16 July 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1998 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 15 July 1998 addressed to you by His Excellency Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Sulaiman R. AL-SAEID
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

98-20902 (E) 170798 170798

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Annex

Letter dated 15 July 1998 from the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait addressed to the Secretary-General

I refer to the letter dated 1 July 1998 addressed to you by Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahhaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq (S/1998/612, annex), in which he alleges that the relevant Kuwaiti authorities have proceeded to sell five Iraqi oil tankers as scrap for 16.5 million United States dollars.

I should like in this connection to place before you the following facts:

1. Iraq used the five tankers mentioned in the letter from its Minister for Foreign Affairs for the theft of large quantities of Kuwaiti oil during its occupation of the State of Kuwait.

2. Iraq moored the tankers in Kuwaiti territorial waters for the purpose of deliberately releasing oil into the sea in order to cause destruction and pollute the marine environment.

3. The condition of the tankers, located as they are in Kuwaiti territorial waters, is such that four of them are unserviceable and that one could be repaired but only at exorbitant cost.

Because of the possible jeopardy to the tankers arising out of the fact that the constant corrosion of their hulls might cause them to founder, as of 30 June 1997 the Kuwaiti authorities concerned had spent some 18.4 million dollars on their maintenance and surveillance.

In closing, I should like to state that Iraq would be better advised to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, by cooperating with the United Nations for the release of the Kuwaiti and third-country prisoners and the return of the Kuwaiti property it seized in a calculated and systematic manner during the occupation, rather than to accuse the State of Kuwait of engaging in illegal acts with regard to these tankers.

(Signed) Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber AL-SABAH
First Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1998/659
16 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 15 July 1998, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

98-20908 (E) 170798

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Annex

Letter dated 15 July 1998 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996, I attach the eighteenth monthly report on the operations of the Stabilization Force (see appendix). I would appreciate your making the report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Appendix

Monthly report to the United Nations Security Council on the operations of the Stabilization Force

1. On 20 June 1998, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) continued its mission under the renewed mandate provided by Security Council resolution 1174 (1998).

2. There are approximately 36,000 troops currently deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. This includes contributions from all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and, with effect from 20 June, from 22 non-NATO nations, Argentina and Slovakia being the latest additions.

3. Over the reporting period (21 May to 20 June 1998), SFOR continued to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance by means of ground and air patrols. Approximately 2,270 sorties were flown by combat aircraft, with the SFOR helicopter fleet flying approximately 125 hours.

4. In late May, in line with the restructuring agreement concluded by the Office of the High Representative in February 1998, SFOR began its withdrawal from the five transmission towers used by Srpska Radio Television at Duga Nijva, Udrigovo and Veliki Zep in Multinational Division (North) and at Trebevic and Leotar in Multinational Division (South-East). The Leotar Tower was returned on 22 May, the Duga Nijva Tower on 28 May and the Udrigovo Tower on 30 May. The other two towers will be transferred in due course.

5. The Stabilization Force has continued to increase its monitoring of crossing points on the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to help ensure compliance with the prohibition on the transport of weapons established by Security Council resolution 1160 (1998). The Stabilization Force has been tasked, within its existing mission and capabilities, to forward to NATO headquarters any information on suspected violations of resolution 1160 (1998), so that it can be transmitted to the United Nations Secretariat.

Cooperation and compliance by the Parties

6. The Parties remain substantially compliant with most military provisions of the Peace Agreement across the whole area of operations. However, over the reporting period a number of Bosniac and Bosnian Serb homes were destroyed by arson attacks.

7. The Stabilization Force continues to monitor compliance with the Common Licence Plate Programme. Over the reporting period, SFOR confiscated 4 Bosnian Croat and 9 Bosniac military vehicles for a 30-day period from non-compliance with the Programme.

8. On 12 June, a group of approximately 150 Bosnian Croats set up 2 roadblocks near the village of Zepce, in Multinational Division (North) to protest the lack of common vehicle licence plates. The protest continued on 13 June, when a third roadblock was established 5 kilometres east of the village. After several meetings over the 2 days between SFOR troops in the area, the mayor of Zepce and

the representatives of the local businessmen who had organized the roadblocks, the situation was resolved and civilian freedom of movement restored on all roads. No violent incidents were reported.

9. Over the reporting period, SFOR troops conducted a total of 314 military weapons storage sites inspections: 80 Bosniac; 70 Bosnian Croat; 146 Bosnian Serb; and 18 Federation. The following weapons were confiscated: from the Bosnian Serbs, 3 64-mm rocket launchers, 1 rifle grenade, 2 boxes of small arms ammunition and several 82-mm mortar rounds; from the Federation, 11 grenades; in addition, on 3 June, SFOR troops confiscated 150 kilograms of ammunition, 2 rifles, 3,500 cartridges, 21 grenades and several explosive devices during inspections of a further 15 sites. In accordance with SFOR policy, the confiscated weapons will be destroyed, after a period of time to allow for appeals.

10. With regard to the Republika Srpska Specialist Police, the Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade and the Police Unit for the Protection of Persons and Buildings have now met the requirements established by SFOR on 15 August 1997. On 10 June, SFOR and the Republika Srpska Ministry of the Interior agreed on the proposed structure for the new Republika Srpska Specialist Police Service and their training programme, which will be led and implemented by the United Nations International Police Task Force. The training programme is scheduled to last from 29 June to 4 September 1998. On completion of certification under the new structure, the former Republika Srpska Specialist Police will be employed as a specialist police force by the Republika Srpska Government, capable of responding to civil requirements and disasters beyond the capability of the local police. However, the decision to transfer the Republika Srpska Specialist Police supervision from Annex 1-A to Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement remains the decision of the Commander of the Stabilization Force.

11. Over the reporting period, SFOR monitored a total of 1,609 training and movement activities: 525 Bosniac; 68 Bosnian Croat; 942 Bosnian Serb; and 74 Federation. The Stabilization Force imposed a training and movement ban (from 25 May to 28 June) on the 505th Bosnian Serb Army Brigade, due to the presence in the Pale area of 5 armed soldiers without identification cards. A second ban was imposed (from 25 June to 14 July) on the 521st Bosnian Serb Brigade and on the 55th Battalion of Military Police, due to non-compliance during an exercise on 7 June.

12. Stabilization Force troops monitored 675 demining operations: 233 Bosniac; 211 Bosnian Croat; 221 Bosnian Serb; and 10 Federation. A total of 175 anti-tank mines, 1,255 anti-personnel mines and 84 items of unexploded ordnance were removed. There are currently no bans imposed on the Entity Armed Forces for non-compliance with demining operations.

13. On 4 June, a meeting of the Joint Military Commission took place at the Bosnian Serb Army Officers' club in Banja Luka, the first such meeting to be held outside Sarajevo. The Stabilization Force invited the army commanders to consider ideas for joint activities between the Entity Armed Forces as a means to develop further confidence and security building measures.

Cooperation with international organizations

14. Within its capabilities, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre, working routinely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Police Task Force, the Office of the High Representative, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

15. The Stabilization Force continues to support OSCE in its preparations for the September elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the provision of a secure environment for voters' registration. Registration of candidates and parties is proceeding, although the registration period has been extended until 28 June.

16. On 28 May, in Banja Luka, and on 15 June in Foca, SFOR troops detained two individuals indicted for war crimes and ensured their transportation to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

17. The Stabilization Force continues to provide assistance to the Office of the High Representative in the field of civil air traffic. The revisions to the Memorandum of Understanding, which will permit cargo operations and allow commercial aircraft to remain overnight at Sarajevo airport, have been agreed by SFOR and are now awaiting approval from the Council of Ministers. In addition, two scheduled services have been introduced over the last month in Banja Luka airport.

18. The Stabilization Force continues to play an active role in providing support to the efforts of the Office of the High Representative to establish joint institutions, particularly the Standing Committee on Military Matters. At the Standing Committee on Military Matters meeting of 21 May, SFOR presented a paper on possible cross-Inter-Entity Boundary Line helicopter flights being conducted by the Entity Armed Forces, in order to transport senior ministers on political duties. The paper was accepted by the Tri-Presidency, who instructed that further work be carried out on the concept, supervised by the secretariat of the Standing Committee on Military Matters.

Outlook

19. Returns of refugees and displaced persons are likely to continue to increase tension and to be accompanied by acts of intimidation and violence, particularly in Central Bosnia and Mostar. The Stabilization Force will continue to help ensure the provision of a secure environment to support and promote phased and orderly returns in accordance with its mandate, but not forcibly return displaced persons or undertake to guard individual locations.

20. The continuation of SFOR beyond 20 June will permit the force to continue to deter renewed hostilities and to contribute to a secure environment for the ongoing implementation of the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement, promoting a transition of emphasis from military to civil implementation. At the same time, SFOR will provide broad support, within its mandate and within means and capabilities, for civil implementation, in particular to key aspects such as

public security, the return of refugees and displaced persons, the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the September elections. Through the incorporation of a multinational specialized unit which will operate as an integral part of SFOR under the same rules of engagement as other elements, it will have an enhanced capability to support the local authorities in responding to civil disorder, without engaging in police functions, in close cooperation with the Office of the High Representative and the International Police Task Force.

21. The continuation of SFOR has been accompanied by the adoption of a transition strategy as an integral part of the force's mission. This strategy will permit and promote a gradual and progressive reduction in the size, role and profile of the force as emphasis shifts from military to civil implementation, leading to eventual full withdrawal, with residual responsibilities being transferred to the common institutions, other civil authorities or other international organizations, as appropriate. Formal reviews will be conducted after the September elections and no later than December 1998, and thereafter at intervals of not more than six months to assess, against a set of identified criteria for measuring progress, the security situation and the overall implementation of the Peace Agreement. These reviews will permit the Allies, in consultation with other SFOR contributors, to consider the possible scope for force reductions, taking into account the level of support required for military and civil implementation and the requirements for deterrence.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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17 July 1998
ENGLISH
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LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter CHKHEIDZE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: English]

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, issued in Tbilisi on 16 July 1998

On 15 July 1998, as a result of the explosion of a cart going from the village of Sida to Zugdidi, eight peace-abiding persons were killed and three were seriously wounded.

The Abkhaz separatist authorities, backed by a number of leaders of the collective Peacekeeping Forces, are carrying out an anti-Georgian campaign, aimed at convincing the public that the above-mentioned and earlier incidents have been carried out by the Georgian side.

Expressing its regret in connection with the above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia is entitled to state the following.

After the execution of the punitive operations in the Gali region in May, the Abkhaz side started mining the roads and paths to Zugdidi, with the aim of preventing the uncontrollable movement of the refugees, letting them pass only at checkpoints after receiving appropriate fees. The above is corroborated by the explosion of the United Nations patrol car in the same zone at the beginning of June.

With cognizance of the above, the Georgian side has full grounds to declare that the full responsibility for the deaths of eight persons near Sida lies with the Abkhaz separatist regime, being a direct result of its policy of ethnic cleansing, robbery and violence.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia appeals again to the Abkhaz side to make constructive steps, through joint efforts, to ease the abnormal situation created in the Gali region and at least minimally ensure the security of the peace-abiding population.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1998/661
20 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the question of the Western Sahara,

Reaffirming its full support for the Secretary-General, his Personal Envoy, his Special Representative and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in the implementation of the Settlement Plan and the agreements reached by the two parties for its implementation, and recalling that under these agreements the responsibility for implementing the identification process lies with the Identification Commission,

Reiterating its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just and lasting solution to the question of the Western Sahara,

Reiterating also its commitment to the holding without further delay of a free, fair and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan, which has been accepted by the two parties,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 10 July 1998 (S/1998/614) and supporting the observations and recommendations contained therein,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 21 September 1998, in order that MINURSO may proceed with its identification tasks, with the aim of completing the process;

2. Welcomes, in line with the report of the Secretary-General, engagement by his Personal Envoy with the parties to seek a solution to those issues bearing upon implementation of the Settlement Plan;

3. Calls upon the parties to cooperate constructively with the United Nations, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Identification Commission established pursuant to the Settlement Plan in order to complete the identification of voters phase of the Settlement Plan and the agreements reached for its implementation;

98-21111 (E) 200798

4. Notes with satisfaction the expressed readiness of the Moroccan Government to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in order to formalize the presence of UNHCR in the Western Sahara, according to the Settlement Plan;

5. Notes the continuing deployment of the engineering units required for demining activities and of the administrative staff required to support the deployment of military personnel as proposed in annex II of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 November 1997 (S/1997/882), as further described in the recommendations of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 April 1998 (S/1998/316);

6. Expresses again its intention to consider positively the request for the remaining additional military and police assets for MINURSO as proposed in annex II of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 November 1997, as soon as the Secretary-General reports that the identification process has reached a stage which makes the deployment of these assets essential;

7. Calls for a prompt conclusion of status-of-forces agreements with the Secretary-General which would greatly facilitate the full and timely deployment of MINURSO-formed military units, in particular the deployment of the military engineering support and demining units, and in this context notes progress that has been made, and recalls that pending the conclusion of such agreements, the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594), as provided for in General Assembly resolution 52/12 B, should apply provisionally;

8. Calls for the lifting of any restrictions imposed on MINURSO aircraft, or on passengers whose travel MINURSO determines to be of assistance to the fulfilment of the mandate, in line with the practice of United Nations peacekeeping operations, and notes that discussions are being held to this end;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every 30 days from the date of extension of the mandate of MINURSO on the progress of the implementation of the Settlement Plan and the agreements reached between the parties, and to keep the Council regularly informed of all significant developments in the interim period, and, as appropriate, on the continuing viability of the mandate of MINURSO;

10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1998/662
17 July 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of an updated memorandum on Eritrean aggression against Ethiopia and continued gross violations of the human rights of Ethiopians in Eritrea.

I should be grateful if you could kindly circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Duri MOHAMMED
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-21039 (E) 200798

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Annex I

Updated memorandum by the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, dated 16 July 1998

Eritrean aggression against Ethiopia and continued gross violations of the human rights of Ethiopians in Eritrea

1. It is now over two months since the unprovoked and naked aggression against Ethiopia was launched by the Eritrean regime. It is well known to the whole world that the Ethiopian Government as well as the international community have been calling upon the Eritrean Government to pull out its invading force from Ethiopian territory and instead to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Nevertheless, the Eritrean regime has so far turned down all the peace proposals in flagrant disregard of the peaceful intentions of Ethiopia, the proposals of the facilitators, namely, the Governments of the United States of America and Rwanda, the resolutions of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations Security Council and the European Union.

2. This being the indisputable fact known to the international community, the Eritrean regime has persisted with its empty rhetoric ad nauseam that it is committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis between the two countries, and has continued to disseminate its baseless accusations against Ethiopia.

3. In this connection, the statement issued on 3 July 1998, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea under the title "Ethiopia's gross violations of the human rights of Eritreans living in Ethiopia", circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/52/974-S/1998/611), is the most recent attempt in the series of unfounded allegations levelled against Ethiopia by the Eritrean regime.

4. That statement is a familiar ploy by the Eritrean authorities aimed at deceiving the international community and covering up the war of aggression against Ethiopia, that is, continued occupation of Ethiopian territory since 12 May 1998, over and above its gross violations of the Geneva conventions of 1949, which the whole world has witnessed in extensive detail, particularly in its air attack on Adigrat and Mekelle, targeting civilians and shelling the social facilities in Zalambassa, Badme, etc., over a period of days. As such, it has come as no surprise to the Ethiopian Government. We believe that the international community will see this latest nefarious posturing by the Eritrean regime for what it really is - a futile attempt by a criminal to cover up his crime.

5. In the light of the above attempt to distort the facts, the Government of Ethiopia is duty-bound once again to put the issue in its proper perspective and to bring additional facts and developments to the attention of the international community at large and relevant international organizations mandated to look into issues of this nature in particular.

6. As has been so commonly manifested in its crude practice of the use of force against civilians, the Eritrean Government once again unashamedly demonstrated its brutal actions targeting Ethiopian civilians.

7. The Eritrean regime, which has no track record in respect of basic human rights and freedoms, and which has declared officially at the highest political level (the President himself) that war has no rules and that indiscriminate killings of civilians is inevitable and justifiable, has no moral ground to talk about violations of human rights.

8. Ever since the Eritrean regime unleashed the unprovoked aggression against Ethiopia, the Eritrean forces have deliberately chosen to strike civilian targets. In this regard, the bombing of an elementary school by the Eritrean Air Force in the city of Mekelle in broad daylight while students were in their classrooms, killing 51 and wounding 136, is a brutal act prohibited under general international humanitarian law, particularly under the Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols which protect civilians during armed conflicts. There is no question that the air strike at the elementary school was a premeditated attack carried out twice within the space of two hours.

9. This act of indiscriminate killing of civilians was repeated on 11 June 1998 in Adigrat, where civilians and relief food supply stores were targeted, killing 4, and wounding 30 civilians, including an 18-month-old baby and a pregnant woman. These victims were the same people previously displaced by the aggressor force from the border town of Zalambessa.

10. The targeting of civilians, social and economic infrastructures is not something unprecedented for the Eritrean regime. The Eritrean aggression started on 12 May 1998 with the destruction of schools, health stations and other infrastructures in the locality of Badme. This has left the entire population of Badme and its environs with no health services and educational facilities. Thousands were displaced and left homeless and are now sheltered in relief centres.

11. In the first week of June, for no reason except to cause destruction, the Eritrean regime indiscriminately shelled and completely destroyed the Ethiopian town of Zalambessa. Its residents, over fifteen thousand (15,000), were compelled to flee to Adigrat, where they were mercilessly bombed again a week later.

12. The Eritrean regime has not limited its act of indiscriminate attack on civilians to northern Ethiopia. It has continued to unleash a campaign of terror against peaceful Ethiopians residing in Eritrea. The Eritrean authorities have been detaining thousands of Ethiopians in the Sawa, Asmara and Assab concentration camps without access to their families, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and journalists. These defenceless Ethiopians continued to be exposed to the worst form of torture, atrocities and inhuman treatment. Many others were dumped on the common border of the two countries. The Eritrean forces have brutally expelled well over 5,000 Ethiopian civilians from Eritrea after depriving them of their property and subjecting many of them to beatings and torture.

13. The parading of an Ethiopian prisoner of war in the streets of Asmara on 6 June 1998 is only one example of the act of brutality that is characteristic of the regime's behaviour from the outset.

14. Ethiopians in Ethiopian territories occupied by Eritrea are being compelled to take up Eritrean citizenship and prevented from carrying out their farming activities if they fail to do so.

15. Despite the appeal made by the international community, the Eritrean regime has continued to violate the basic human rights of Ethiopians. Recently, about 30,000 Ethiopians residing in Assab have been denied the right to work or to leave for their country. As a consequence of this outrageous act, two women, who were unable to feed their families, have committed suicide. Some were also subjected to rigorous forms of supervision, whereby they are obliged to report to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) office every day.

16. Furthermore, about 60 Ethiopian nationals died of asphyxiation in the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab after being locked in an unventilated cargo container.

17. The Eritrean regime, in full disregard of the ongoing effort of the international community to ban anti-personnel landmines and to support the demining endeavour in our subregion, is extensively and indiscriminately using these deadly weapons to terrorize civilians, deny them access to farmlands, causing famine and forcing people to flee their homes and eventually to depopulate the occupied territories. As the result of deliberate use of these weapons, hundreds of innocent civilians and cattle were killed, and many other civilians were maimed. Such practices are a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and should be condemned unequivocally.

18. As a result of the naked and blatant aggression of the Eritrean regime and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, the number of displaced persons has now reached 194,000 and it is expected that this number will soon reach 300,000.

19. The Eritrean authorities have not limited their criminal acts to blatant aggression and gross violations of human rights. They have been trying to complement these acts with various terrorist and espionage networking activities inside Ethiopia. To this end, the EPLF's clandestine organization called "People's Front for Democracy and Justice" has been undertaking a sinister move to organize its underground structure in all parts of Ethiopia, which the Government of Ethiopia unveiled at the earliest stage (see annex II). The aim of this clandestine activity is the destabilization of Ethiopia using Eritrean nationals residing in Ethiopia. This is, to say the least, clearly an abuse of privilege by a category of foreign nationals residing in Ethiopia. Since no self-respecting State can allow itself to be destabilized in such a manner, legitimate measures taken by the Ethiopean Government to counter this threat to national security should be seen in this light.

20. In contravention of the principles laid down under Articles 2 and 10 of the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States of 8 July 1985, and the provisions related with the access of land-locked States to and from the sea and

freedom of transit under Part X (Arts. 124-132) of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, as well as terms of the Bilateral Agreement on Transit and Port Services signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea on 29 September 1993, the Eritrean authorities have seized a total of more than 135,000 tons of dry cargo, 46,741 metric cube of liquid cargo and 51 metric tons of asphalt, without any legal ground, at the Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab. These are goods destined for relief, and civilian projects designed to address the basic needs of the people. It is to be noted that the Government of Eritrea is currently transporting seized goods from the ports of Assab and Massawa to Asmara, for which Ethiopia is the proprietor.

21. On the contrary, the Ethiopian Government's reaction to the unprovoked aggression by the Eritrean regime was based on the cardinal principles of international law and relevant conventions. Even weeks after the aggression was committed by the invading forces, the Ethiopian Government has not responded in kind and has exercised maximum restraint, even though it was fully justified to do so under international law. The defensive air strike by the Ethiopian Air Force only targeted military installations at the Eritrean Air Force base in Asmara. As far as the ground war is concerned, Ethiopia has continued to defend its territory from further encroachment by Eritrean forces. Moreover, it has treated prisoners of war taken as the result of the military engagement with Eritrean forces in the most human way. ICRC and other concerned agencies have full access to visit Eritrean prisoners of war.

22. Furthermore, the policy of the Ethiopian Government towards Eritreans residing in Ethiopia is based on the solid principle of friendship and a bond of common destiny. Even in the face of naked aggression and continuous provocation by the Eritrean regime, the Ethiopian Government is totally committed to respect the rights of Eritreans living in its territory and fully guarantees them the right to live and work in peace. Under no circumstances will the Ethiopian Government succumb to a tit-for-tat exercise with the Eritrean regime in the treatment of civilians in conflict situations.

23. However, the Government of Ethiopia, as a victim of unprovoked aggression, has taken precautionary measures on former EPLF combatants, members of the EPLF's clandestine organization called "People's Front for Democracy and Justice", and conscripts who entered Ethiopia taking advantage of the visa liberalization policy, and on those who have been found contributing materially and financially to Eritrea's war of aggression. These measures have been taken in full transparency and according to pertinent international norms and principles.

24. Moreover, Ethiopia has facilitated, and will continue to do so, for ICRC, concerned United Nations agencies and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, regular access to prisoners of war and temporarily detained Eritrean civilians, while the Eritrean regime, in spite of the promises it has made, has so far never allowed ICRC and other concerned United Nations bodies to have any access to Ethiopian civilian detainees and prisoners of war (annex III).

25. In the light of the foregoing, the Government of Ethiopia would like to reiterate, that the Eritrean Government has neither the moral nor the political

standing to accuse Ethiopia of violating the basic human rights of Eritreans currently residing in Ethiopia. It is the Eritrean regime which is solely responsible for committing gross and flagrant violation of basic human rights and freedoms and principles of international humanitarian law. And yet it has the audacity to accuse Ethiopia of human rights violations. This behaviour is indeed a glaring demonstration of the extent of hypocrisy of the Eritrean regime.

26. The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia believes that the United Nations, regional organizations and their member States have legal, political as well as moral responsibility to take all measures with a view to preventing the Eritrean aggressor from further grave breaches of International law.

27. To this end, the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia again calls upon the international community, inter alia, to:

- Expose the hypocrisy and temerity of the Eritrean Government in trying to invoke international human rights instruments, not a single one of which it has even signed, let alone ratified, over and above its fabrication of facts and figures;

- Condemn in the strongest terms possible the Eritrean aggression against Ethiopia and gross violations of the basic human rights of Ethiopians peacefully living in Eritrea;

- Secure unhindered access for human rights organizations and humanitarian agencies to areas where Ethiopian nationals have been arbitrarily detained, so that steps can be taken to locate and take them to areas where their personal safety and security can be assured and secure their unconditional release;

- Ensure the unconditional return of the properties of Ethiopian civilians and businessmen confiscated and robbed by the Eritrean regime, as well as detained shipments at the ports of Assab and Massawa;

- Put pressure on the Eritrean Government to abide by the principles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, which are generally recognized as norms of international law that govern inter-State relations.

28. And further calls upon:

- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other agencies of the United Nations system to make a coordinated response in supporting the thousands of internally displaced persons and those Ethiopian civilians forcefully evicted from Eritrea;

- International human rights organizations, in particular the United Nations Human Rights Commission to investigate and make public the continuing arrests, harassment, intimidation, torture, arbitrary killings and disappearances of Ethiopian nationals in Eritrea.

The Government of Ethiopia, regardless of the inhuman and criminal acts of the Eritrean regime in targeting civilians and civilian installations and the maltreatment of Ethiopian nationals in Eritrea, assures the international community that it remains committed to live up to international standards and norms in the treatment of Eritrean civilians peacefully residing in Ethiopia.

Annex II

Short synopsis of the loss of life, population displacement and destruction of property caused by the unprovoked Eritrean aggression against Ethiopia since May 1998

1. Occupied territories (Badme, part of Shiraro, Atsemeyti and Adi-Tsetser)

12 May	-	20 people were killed, a further 20 were wounded and 370 people were displaced;
13 May-4 June	-	23 social facilities, comprising 12 elementary schools, 9 health posts and 2 clinics, were destroyed;
	-	30 Ethiopians were kidnapped, 8 others were jailed, and 3 civilians were publicly executed;
	-	1,800 quintals of agricultural inputs and grain stored to be distributed to draught victims in the area, thousands of domestic animals, construction materials worth around 100,000 birr and other properties were looted;
	-	Work on 18 boreholes expected to benefit more than 10,000 people was disrupted;
1-12 July	-	Eight churches containing highly valued icons and ceremonial crosses, were looted;
	-	Over 370 Ethiopians were expelled.

2. Makelle town

5 June	-	Eritrean warplanes, targeting primarily civilian targets, killed 51 people and wounded 136 others aged between 5 and 70. The victims of the raids were students in school compounds and families who happened to be in the vicinity looking for their children.

3. Adigrat town

11 June	-	Eritrean warplanes unleashed a second air attack on civilian establishments. As a result of that attack, 4 persons were killed and over 30 others were wounded, while a warehouse of the Commission for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness was seriously damaged and relief supplies (20 thousand quintals of grain and 13,500 litres of edible oil), which were meant for displaced civilians from battle zones, were destroyed.

4. Asmara and its environs

9 June	-	Eritrean security forces evicted over 3,000 Ethiopian civilians and detained about 600 others, confiscating their property, including personal belongings and inflicting inhuman suffering. Many of them were deported through hostile territory across the common border in an inhuman manner.

5. Assab

9 June	-	More than 1,000 Ethiopians who were evicted from Assab were subjected to the worst form of torture and inhuman treatment;
8 July	-	Eritrean authorities expelled 200 Ethiopian teachers, students and merchants from Assab to Djibouti, confiscating their personal possessions;
14 July	-	About 30,000 Ethiopians have been denied their right to work and leave to their country. Two Ethiopian women, who are unable to feed their families, committed suicide. Some were exposed to rigorous forms of supervision whereby they are subjected to report to the EPLF office every day;
15 July	-	About 60 Ethiopian nationals died of asphyxiation in the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab after being locked in an unventilated cargo container.

6. Other parts of Eritrea (Dekemehari, Senafe, Adikei, Massawa, Umahajjer and Tesseney)

11 June	-	Another group of Ethiopians, numbering more than 180, were subjected to the same type of inhuman treatment and deported to Ethiopia.

7. Dislocation of Ethiopian population

As the result of this naked and blatant Eritrean aggression, the number of displaced persons has now reached 194,000 and it is expected that this number will reach 300,000.

8. Illegal detention of shipments destined to Ethiopia at the ports of Assab and Massawa

The Eritrean authorities have detained a total of more than 135,000 tons of dry cargo, 46,741 metric cubes of liquid cargo and 51 metric tons of asphalt, without any legal ground, at the Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab. These are goods destined for relief and civilian projects designed to address the basic needs of the people.

This short list of crimes committed by the Eritrean aggressor against defenceless civilians, including women and children, cannot be confused with border disputes. These are crimes against humanity which the international community must denounce and condemn without hesitation.

Annex III

People's front for democracy and justice

(clandestine organizational structure of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in Ethiopia)

Adapted from the structure prepared by the EPLF in the Tigrigna Language



Annex IV

Press statement issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross in issue No. 27 of "ICRC News" dated 9 July 1998

ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

ICRC DELEGATES VISIT PRISONERS OF WAR AND PROVIDE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR CONFLICT VICTIMS

The ICRC carried out two visits to the 163 prisoners of war being held in Fiche camp, the first on 27 June and the second on 2 July. All of these prisoners have now been registered.

On 26 June a visit was also made to the civilian internees being held in Fiche in order to register those who had arrived since the ICRC first went to the camp on 20 June. At the end of the second visit a total of 664 civilian internees had been registered.

All the visits were conducted in accordance with the ICRC's standard working procedures and will be repeated on a regular basis.

The civilian internees and prisoners of war who had not yet been in contact with their families wrote Red Cross messages which will be distributed via the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, the Red Cross Society of Eritrea and other National Societies.

In close conjunction with the Tigray branch of the Ethiopian Red Cross and the regional health authorities, the ICRC furnished additional medical supplies to be distributed to hospitals and other medical facilities in the northern Tigray region of the country.

In Eritrea, the National Society is continuing to provide medical facilities with ambulances and volunteers near potential conflict areas along the Ethiopian border. Such action has proved helpful in the past, particularly when fighting broke out near the town of Zalambessa and in the south-eastern border area. Local Red Cross branches are being regularly resupplied with first-aid equipment and other essential non-food items. At the same time, in cooperation with local authorities, the Eritrean Red Cross is continuing to assess the situation of displaced persons and other civilians affected by the conflict.

As part of their tracing activities, the ICRC and the Eritrean Red Cross have so far collected 16 Red Cross messages from the families of young men who were studying in Ethiopia under a bilateral exchange programme. Meanwhile, the ICRC is keeping up its dialogue with the authorities in Asmara concerning the protection of persons wounded or captured during the recent fighting.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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20 July 1998
ENGLISH
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LETTER DATED 19 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 19 July 1998 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahhaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. It concerns the fact that the United States of America, a permanent member of the Security Council, is continuing to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs in order to threaten the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity and place the security of its people at serious risk.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-21192 (E) 210798 210798

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Annex

Letter dated 19 July 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

There continue to be statements made by United States officials at all levels as well as press reports based on reliable information that clearly display the persistence and obduracy of the United States Administration in its constant interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Iraq - a sovereign, independent country and a founding Member of the United Nations - in order to threaten its sovereignty and territorial integrity and place the security of its people at serious risk.

1. By my letter dated 22 May 1998 (S/1998/431, annex), we informed the President of the Security Council for the month of May of statements made by Richard Perle, a former United States Under Secretary of Defense, confirming the political objectives of the United States of America and its hostile intentions with regard to my country, Iraq.

2. By my letter dated 19 June 1998 (S/1998/546, annex), we informed the President of the Security Council for the month of June of the statements made by Martin Indyk, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and North African Affairs, at a seminar for regional journalists held at the United States Department of State. On that occasion, he shamelessly announced that the United States Administration was planning to cooperate with bands of renegades, criminals, thieves and outlaws operating outside Iraq and to disburse United States funds to them in a new effort funded by Congress to build up what he claimed was political opposition to President Saddam Hussein.

3. I should now like to call your attention to new information that was published by the American newspaper the Wall Street Journal on 17 July 1998 in an article by its correspondent David Rodgers under the headline "Clinton Seeking Support for Plan Against Saddam" (see enclosure). The information given sheds light on new plans being studied at the highest levels of the United States Administration and the United States Congress in a frantic attempt to secure legislation giving the United States Administration broad authority to plan and mount clandestine and overt operations against Mr. Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq, against Iraq and against the Iraqi people, all previous such hostile operations having met with abject failure.

The information published in the Wall Street Journal indicates that officials of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, alongside others from the Central Intelligence Agency, are discussing with the United States Congress the elaboration of what they call "a combined overt-covert strategy to weaken and potentially oust the Iraqi leader". Information is also provided to the effect that the United States Administration has "sent to Congress a classified notice or 'finding' seeking approval to tap secret contingency funds within the defense and intelligence budget". It is to be noted that the information provided by the Wall Street Journal indicates that prominent members of the United States Congress, including Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives, held a private meeting with the United

States Secretary of Defense for this purpose and that Senate Republican majority leader Trent Lott met with retired general Wayne Downing, former chief of the United States Special Operations Command, to assess what are referred to as potential military options against Iraq and against President Saddam Hussein. General Downing confirmed that he had briefed Senate members on what he characterized as a range of options regarding Iraq, saying "I discussed with them things that could be done".

We have been anxious to keep the members of the Security Council informed of the hostile official actions taken time and again by the United States Administration against Iraq. We have, however, seen no reaction on the part of the Council to the grave matter of the hostile actions taken and official statements made by the United States Administration to threaten the sovereignty and independence of Iraq and the security of its people in violation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law. Worst of all, the State that engages in all these hostile and unlawful acts is a permanent member of the Security Council and thus one that, in common with all the other permanent members, is supposed to be committed to respect for the Charter of the United Nations and international law and is not supposed to conduct itself, as is actually the case, as an outlaw State under international law.

The new information that we are bringing to the attention of the members of the Security Council is one more indication that the Government of the United States of America is persisting in its adoption of a very dangerous approach to international relations and one that is incompatible with the duties of a permanent member of the Security Council and is to be regarded as being in serious breach of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq condemns in the strongest terms the hostile measures and actions that are being taken by the United States Administration against Iraq. The Government of Iraq reiterates its call for the condemnation of this hostile United States policy against Iraq. It calls upon the Council to take action to urge the United States Administration to desist from its policy of conspiracy and incitement against the security, independence and territorial integrity of Iraq, to counter these wilful and unlawful official actions on the part of the United States and to adopt measures to ensure respect for Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and prevent the United States Administration from pursuing its unlawful policy against Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council, if you would raise it as a topic in the Council's consultations and if you would have it circulated as a Council document.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

Enclosure

[Original: English]

Wall Street Journal: Friday 17, July 1998

Clinton Seeking Support for Plan Against Saddam

Congress Is Asked to Give Broad New Authority For Covert Operations

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By David Rodgers

Washington-The Clinton administration is seeking broad new authority from Congress to plan and mount covert operations against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

The secret initiative would go far beyond past efforts by the Central Intelligence Agency to encourage resistance inside Iraq. Top State Department and Pentagon officials have participated alongside the CIA in discussions with Congress, and what is anticipated is a combined overt-covert strategy to weaken and potentially oust the Iraqi leader.

This combined emphasis distinguishes the plan from past operations against Saddam Hussein, which have failed. Government officials familiar with the talks said the administration has sought to bring more assets to bear, perhaps including the potential use of U.S. military personnel. The scale of the initiative would require more than a year of staging, but appears timed to be fully launched before the end of President Clinton's term in office.

Administration officials declined to comment on the talks bow with Congress, but the administration already has sent to Congress a classified notice or "finding" seeking approval to tap secret contingency funds within the defense and intelligence budget.

Congress Finds Plan Vague

Within the Senate Intelligence Committee, the initial finding faces bipartisan resistance, and there is pressure in the House Appropriation Committee to tighten and narrow the authority granted to the president. Lawmakers complain the Clinton administration is still too vague in its approach.

Still, White House allies hope that the refinements can yet produce some consensus on the proposal. As now drafted, the House-passed intelligence budget for the next year includes contingency funds that could be tapped; the issue then could be part of talks when House-Senate negotiators meet to resolve their differences.

The administration already has funds available to pursue an open policy of support for Iraqi opposition groups. Earlier this year, Congress approved $10 million for this purpose, including the establishment of a new Radio-Free Iraq program. A recent State Department report to Congress outlines plans to establish an Iraqi center in suburban London and to support future conferences for the opposition in exile.

The policy debate now under way is driven by the continued frustration born of last winter's confrontation with Iraq, when the two nations almost came to blows in a dispute over United Nations weapons inspections. Certainly, top Republicans in Congress have been outspoken in

demanding that the administration take a more aggressive posture against Saddam Hussein. In the midst of the earlier crisis, House Speaker Newt Gingrich devoted most of a private meeting with Defense Secretary William Cohen to this topic. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi later hosted his own meeting in April with retired Gen. Wayne Downing, former chief of U.S. Special Operations Command, to assess potential military options against Saddam Hussein.

Downing's Role

The Downing briefing, which hasn't previously been disclosed, drew a small set of Democratic as well as republican senators. Mr. Lott's office later tried unsuccessfully to set up a meeting among the general and Mr. Cohen and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. There was a shortlived interest-quickly killed by Democrats-in using taxpayer funds to hire a private military training company to work with the Iraqi resistance, much as retired U.S. military personnel have been used to train forces in Bosnia.

In a brief telephone interview yesterday, Gen. Downing confirmed he had briefed the senators on a range of options regarding Iraq, but he said he had no formal relationship with the resistance or any private business interest in the matter. "I discussed with them things that could be done," said the 58 year old retired officer, who has a long history of Service in Army Ranger and special-operations commands.

Within the administration, there was clear annoyance with what was seen as "freelancing" by Congress on military affairs. But the incident is telling as a sign of the level of frustration after the history of past anti-Saddam operations.

The Bush administration was the first to initiate a policy of U.S. covert operations, seeking the dictator's ouster in part by aiding Iraqi nationals opposed to his rule. The effort was continued under Mr. Clinton's watch. Yet, after nearly eight years and tens of millions of dollars, Saddam Hussein remains in power, and hundreds of Iraqis are dead or imprisoned after being allied with the U.S.

The most severe setback came two years ago, when Saddam brought armored units to Northern Iraq against Kurds who had worked with CIA operatives there. In the aftermath, the agency was further embarrassed when a veteran agent, Warren Marik, went public with his criticism of the operation.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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20 July 1998
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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 19 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the violations of Iraq's airspace by United States aircraft continued over the period from 1 to 15 July 1998 and that those aircraft carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation. The details are as set forth in the annex to this letter.

You are requested to intervene with a view to bringing a halt to the actions which, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause material damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq asserts its right to seek legal compensation for the losses being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Republic of Iraq in consequence of these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations of Iraq's airspace and damage caused during the period 1-15 July 1998

1. In the northern region, 104 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Dohuk, Mosul, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Zakho, Irbil, Tall Afar, Rawandoz, Kuysanjaq and Rabi'ah.

2. In the southern region, 483 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Ushbayjah, Jalibah, Salman, Busayyah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Shinafiyah, Rumaythah, Basra, Hayy, Shatrah, Amarah, Qal'at Sukkar, Safwan, Suq al-Shuyukh, Hamzah, Maymunah, Abu Sukhayr, Taqtaqanah, Rifa'i, Najaf, Shithathah, Amghar, Ma'aniyah, Qal'at Salih, Ali al-Sharqi and Nukhayb.

3. There were 10 violations by sorties flown by TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft at a height of 20,000 metres and at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour.

4. At 1330 and 1400 hours on 1 July 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the city of Umm Qasr.

5. At 1015 and 1100 hours on 2 and 3 July 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the city of Umm Qasr.

6. At 1015 hours on 7 July 1998, a formation consisting of two United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over the Saddam Dam.

7. At 0950, 0917, 0935, 0940, 0950 and 1235 hours on 8 July 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the city of Umm Qasr.

8. At 0805 and 0945 hours on 11 July 1998, United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the city of Umm Qasr.

9. At 1203 hours on 11 July 1998, a formation of two United States aircraft dropped eight heat flares over the Rabi'ah area (Ninawa Governorate).

10. At 1030 hours on 13 July 1998, a formation of two United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over the city of Mosul.

11. At 1110 hours on 14 July 1998, a formation of two United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over the Alqosh area (city of Mosul).

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LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement issued on 18 July 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan (see annex).

I should be very grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and the annexed statement circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rashid ALIMOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Tajikistan to the
United Nations

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Annex

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Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan

Recently in some of the mass information media all kinds of "informatio and "analyses" have started to appear, purporting to "explain" the reasons fo the delay in the peace process in Tajikistan, which is supposedly in a virtua impasse at present. Both veiled and open attempts are being made to cast a shadow on the Government's tireless efforts for the scrupulous implementation the provisions of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan firmly rejects this interpretation of the situation. Since the parties to the forme conflict are lagging behind somewhat in the timetable for the implementation the agreements reached, this naturally gives rise to concern on the part of bo the Government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), but this situation, whic can be explained by a number of objective and subjective reasons, will in no w affect their resolve to fulfil their duty to their country and people to the end.

At their latest meeting, Mr. E. S. Rakhmonov, President of the Republic o Tajikistan and Mr. S. A. Nuri, Chairman of the Commission on National Reconciliation, noted the unjustifiably slow and unbalanced implementation of the General Agreement, and the extremely weak efforts to prevent violations of it. The two parties reached an understanding on the need to accelerate the implementation of all aspects of the Agreement and expressed their willingness to intensify efforts for the integral implementation of the peace agreements.

During this time a considerable amount has been done. The Commission on National Reconciliation has begun to operate on a permanent basis in Dushanbe. Virtually the entire leadership of the opposition forces has arrived and is living and working in the city of Dushanbe. The Government is taking concrete measures to improve their living conditions, which, along with the further stabilization of the situation, has basically made it possible for the leaders of UTO to bring back their families from exile. UTO representatives have been appointed to six posts in the Government. The process of swearing in the opposition armed formations has begun within the framework of their reintegration into the Government forces, and 600 men have now been sworn in. Over 150 members of the last remaining UTO formation in the territory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan have been transferred from that country to their place of permanent stationing. Most of the participants in the former militar political opposition have received amnesty and have been released from their places of detention. The process of the release of prisoners of war and the return of refugees from the Islamic State of Afghanistan has been fully completed. The President of Tajikistan has also sent to the Majilis-i Olii

of peace and national accord, the President vetoed the 'Law on political parties' adopted by the Majilis-i Oli, which provided for a ban on the establishment of parties on a religious basis, and the bill went back to the parliament to be reworked. A number of other steps have been taken aimed at accelerating the process of implementation of the agreements reached. All this demonstrates the firm desire of the Government and UTO to implement the provisions of the general peace agreement.

However, this in no way means that there are no obstacles on the arduous course of their implementation. A number of clashes between individual military formations have caused serious damage to the cause of peace. Because of the inability of the opposition to assemble in one place all the UTO combatants remaining in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, their transfer to the place of permanent stationing has not been completed.

As to the inclusion of other UTO representatives in the Government, an agreement in principle has been reached between the parties on this question. In accordance with the statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation, however, the UTO proposals on the inclusion of its representatives in the Government should be submitted to a meeting of the Commission, and after that its decision would be sent for consideration by the President. However, because of the absence from Dushanbe of Mr. S. A. Nuri, who for the last three weeks has been in the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to bring back members of his family and refugees, the Commission has not yet considered the question or taken a decision on it. Similarly, the subcommissions of the Commission on National Reconciliation have not completed their consideration of the question of making amendments to the 'Law on elections' on the basis of which parliamentary elections would be set.

All this demonstrates that the groundless accusations against the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan of delaying the implementation of the provisions of the general peace agreement are nothing other than deliberate disinformation to the world community. In reality, everything possible is being done to complete successfully the process of establishing lasting peace and stability in Tajikistan and to continue under new conditions the accelerated implementation of the programmes for the restructuring of the economy on market foundations and ensuring Tajikistan's stable development.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, once again confirming the Government's resolve for the onward development of the peace process, expresses the hope that the world community and the entire international organization will provide all possible practical, including financial, support to this process and thereby contribute to the rapid attainment of peace and stability in Tajikistan.